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OVERVIEW OF CONSTITUTIONAL COUR)' DECISION~ ON THE BU..L OF RIGHTS- 2006 409 
AMBIT OF MINERAL RIGHfS: PAVING THE WAY FOR NEW ORDER 
DISPUTES? . 
Anglo Operations Ltd v Sandhurst Estates ( Pty) Ltd 2006 1 SA 350 (T) 
1 Introduction 
The ambit of a real right~ such as a mineral right; is determined by ascertaining 
the content thereof by identifying and listing its entitlements as well as identi-
fying the limitatioD:S placed upon the exercise of such right. Once the ambit of a 
right (and/or competing rights) is determ.i:O.ed, the relationship or possible 
conflict between parties holding different rights to the same legal object may 
be ascertained. This contribution is a discussion of the recent decision in Anglo 
Operations Ltd v Sandhurst Estates ( Pty) Ltd 2006 .I SA 350 (T) in which the 
content of mineral rights in the context of the doctrine of lateral support was 
considered. A brief exposition of the relevant facts follows, whereafter the 
arguments entertained by the court ·is discussed. The court's decision on the 
ambit of mineral rights and the applicability of the property clause to the 
present case will then receive attention, before the general ~pact of the deci-
sion iS discussed in more detail. 
2 Facts 
The facts of the decision may be summarised as follows: during 1962 Arthur 
Sulski was the registered owner and holder of mineral rights over a farm 
subject to the reservation of one-sixth shate of .all mineral rights in ,favour oJ 
Morris ~ulski (357C-E). The property is situated on a portion of the Kriel 
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South 'Coal Field (358C). Du.ri.Ii.g 1968: Arthur Sulski. ceded to African and 
Euro¢,an Investment Co Ltd ("AEIC:.') a five-sixth share in coal rights of 
the prbperty (357E-F) subject to inter alia the· following condition: "1 
[AEiq shall have all such rights as may be needed for proper mining and 
exploiting the coal in, on and imder all:of the said property" (355H). 
Morps SUiski in tm:n ceded to AlEC a one-sixth share in the coal rights 
(357E)~ "including any mineral, clay and shale, either associated with coal 
seams pr occuiring separately within the limits of the coal measures in, on 
and un,kier'' the farm (356A-I), subject tp inter alia the following conditions: 
"l(a) The cedent. to the extent to which he is entitled to do so, giYes and grants to [AEiq the 
follo~ rlgh.ts and privileges in perpetuity: · 
(i) tq.e right to search for, win, dig. mine and remove coal from the pr9perty and such coal 
r.:psed make merchantable and fit for sale and carry away, sell and dispose of the same for 
tl\e use and benefit of [AEIC]; 
(ii) ~ such ancillary or other rights as the ceqent may be poSsessed of, whether expressly. or 
~pliedly in terms efhis entitlement to minerals or otherwise" {356I-357A). 
i 
Thus, ~er the abovementioned cessio~ .Arthur Sulski remained the owner of 
the property (3570), whilst Monis Sulskj_retained no interest in the property in 
respect!of coal rights: However, at 357G the court incorrectly indicated that 
Morris Sulski retained no interest in the property at all: in terms of the "Morris 
Sulski qession", Morris Sulski, as ceden~ reserved (or retained) "the rights to · 
all minfrals, other than coal" (357A). ..: · 
During 2001 AEIC ceded aU its rights to coal in the property to Anglo 
Opera~ons Ltd ("Anglo'') (3550-E). ne terms of the cessions by the Sulskis 
have bt1Cn incorporated iJi. the cessions by ABIC to Anglo. At the time of the 
application Anglo held all rights to coill in respect of the property (355D), 
whilst ~andhurst Estates (Pty) Ltd ("S$dhurst") was the registered owner 
of the Rroperty and conducted farming O.n the property (355C). 
Angl9 applied for an order that it is entitled to (a) utilise 60 295 hectares on 
the northern portion of Sandhurst's property for open-cast mining purposes; 
and (b) ~nstruct. a diversion of a small stream on the property (355A-B, 3580-
E). Angto contended that factually it coUld not utilise its mineral rights over a 
portion: of the respondent's property opti~ly by underground mining meth-
ods . .Anglo contended it would be entitled. .to· ensure optimal utilisation, namely 
to condfc.t open-cast mjning. It was argued that it will be entitle4 to conduct 
open~t mining because it will act' reasgnably with respect to the surface of 
the prof~.(~83C-B). _Anglo conte~ded·ljthat it was entitled to unde~e the 
open-ca~ mmmg by virtue· of: (a) Its common law and statutory nghts as 
holder of the mineral rights to coal; and/or (b) the ancillary rights conferred 
in te~ of the cessions (358E) . 
. San~urst disputed the applicant~s entitlements to undertake the open-cast 
mining activities on the property (358D .. F). 
3 Arg-4ments submitted on behalf of the ··applicant 
In a n:rcll, it was arglilld on behalf of tbj: applica.nt that a holder of a mineral 
right , beside the primary right to the, mineral, also an ancillary right. By 
virtue o the ancillary right one is entitled io do anything whatsoever on the 
proPertt of the owner of the land that is ~equired for optimal utilisation ofthe 
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'· 
primary right.· The ancillary right would in9lude the entitlement to conduct 
open-cast mining. The ancillary right was, however, subject to the proviso that 
it should be exercised civi#ter modo with regard to the rights of the ·owner 
(361F). It was further argued, fQr purposes of the conflict between the exercise 
of a mineral right and ownership of land, that there was only one limitation on 
the mineral right holder's preferential right at common law to find and extract 
minerals from the land. This limitation required that the preferential rigb.t had 
to be exercised civiliter .modo and in a manner least injUrious to the property of 
the surface owner (364B-C). Support for this view was sought from .the decision 
of Hudson v Mann 1950 4 SA 485 (f) 488E~G (3620), FrankHn and Kaplan 
The Mining and Mineral Laws of South Africa (1982) 132 (364C) and section 
5(1) of the Minerals Act 50 of 1991 (3601-361A). A distinction was also drawn 
in argument between the resolution of the conflict between neighbouring land-
owners (providing lateral support) and a holder of mineral rights and a land-
owner (providing surface support) (see 3621-3630). It was stated that, due to 
the precedent of London SA Exploration Co v Rouliot ((1891) 8 SC 74 92 94), 
the English law to lateral support was also part of Roman-Dutch law (363).1t 
was further argued that the statement in Coronat~n· Collieries v Malan (1911 
TPD 577) that "the same principles apply to the right of vertical and to the 
right of lateral support" was incorrect (3630). In England, the doctrine of 
nuisance protects the right of lateral support. However, ~twas ar~ed, in Regal 
v African Supers/ate (Pty) Ltd (1963 1 SA 102 (A)) the appellate division held 
that the tort of nuisance does not form part of our law (363H). It was thus 
argued that there was no basis for the contention that the doctrine of lateral 
support is part of our law by virtue of its importation of the English law of 
nuisance (3631). De Villiers J, however, disposed. of counsel's arguments by 
deciding: 
''The applicant has not shown that the mineral rights holder has a preferential right under 
Roman or Roman-Dutch law, or any other system of law. Hudson v Mann is the only authority 
quoted by the applicant. This case does not deal with support. It did not overrule Rouliot or 
Coronation with r«?gard to silpport" (37t.E). 
Due to the importance of Hudson v Mann, as locus classicus, the following 
dictum of Malan J is stated: 
"When the. owners are able reasonably to enjoy their respective rights without any clashing of 
interests no dispute is, as a." rule, likely to arise. The difficulty arises, as has happened in the 
present case, when the respective claims enter into com:Petition and there is no rooJ?l for the 
exercise of the rights of both parties simultaneously. 
The principles underlying the decisions appear .to be that the grantee of mineral rights may resist 
interference with a reasonable exercise of those rights either by the grantor or by those who 
derive title through him. In case of irreconcilable conflict tl;J.e use of the surface rights must be 
subordinated to mineral exploitation. The solution of dispute in such ·a case appears to me to 
resolve itself into iii- detepn.ination of a question of fact, viz., whether or not the holder of the 
mineral rights act bona fide and reasonably in the course of exercising his rights •. He must 
exercise his rights in a manner least onerous or injurious to the owner of the surface 4ghts, but 
he is not obliged to forego o:i"dinary. and reasonable enjoyment merely because his operations or 
activities are detrimental to the interests of the surface owner. The fact that the use to which the 
owner of the surface rights puts the property is earlier in point of time cannot derogate from the 
rights of the holder of mineral rights" (4880-G). 
In the Rouliot decision (89) the lateral support issue was formulated as follows 
[ISSN 0257-7747} TSAR 2007·2 
412 BADENHORST AND MOSTERT 
by De Villiers CJ: "[Is] the defendant-entitl~ to remove ground from within liis 
own cla.il:tis with regard to the effect whi¢h such- removal may have upon 
adjoining )and belonging to the plaintiff eompany?'' (see 364F). According 
to De Villiers J in the Anglo decision, the Rouliot decision concerned: (a) an 
analogous: situation to neighbouring own~rs; (b) lateral support; and (c) re .. 
moval of s-b.pport which would have, but b.aQ· not yet, resulted in damage to the 
plaintiffs t4n.d (364F-G). In deciding the lateral support issue, De Villiers CJ in 
effect decided two issues, the first founded in property law and the second in 
the law. ofl contract (364H). On the property Ia~ issue it was decided that a 
neighbour ,was not entitled to remove .support and thereby damage adjoining 
property. De Villiers CJ reasoned the landoWn.er had a right to support from 
subjacent fllld adjacent land (93 at ·364H-I).-:De Villiers· CJ decided the law of 
contract i~e by implying, ex lege, a term ~to the contract of lease that the 
surface owner did not waive or abandon his right of support (93-94 at 365A). 
The decisicins of the other two judges in the 'Rouliot decision are also discussed 
by De Villiers J (see 3641-365). The conclusion of De Villiers J of the Rouliot 
I 
decision wi'1l sUffice: two of the three judges·decided the property law issue on 
the basis ~at a surface owner had the right of enjoyment of the surface which 
could_ be N-otected against outsiders. The contract issue was decided on the 
basis of mi implied term in favour or thei:surface owner (365E). This two-
pronged a;t,Jproach in the Rouliot decision influenced the court in the Anglo 
decision. As to the origin of the duty to lateral support, the Rouliot decision 
was expla.Uied ·as follows by De Villiers J: · 
. . 
"[The two jpdgesJ simply introduced, as Judge-made law, a rule which they regard as common to 
all ci~ systems of Jaw because, as they percei-w:ed it a lacuna existed •. The Judges did not 
concern tb.~lves with the exact pedigree of the rule, nor with the question of whether the duty 
of support was absolute or not. The rule was introduced because it was regarded as j~t and 
•equitable" (366B-C). 
According to De.Villiers J, the full bench in;the Coronation decision held that 
the law witP. regard to lateral support, as .laid down in the Rouliot decision, 
applied to \·subjacent support (366). The coiut also decided that a lease or 
transfer of mineral rights "even though acCompanied by the widest powers 
of working; carries with it no power to let .down the surface, unless such a 
power is granted either expressly or by n~ary implicaticm"(366F-G). 
De Villiefs J reasoned that· the analysis of;the aforegoing cases showed that 
the right of support was not imported because it was English, Ro:mari, or 
Roman-Dutch law (3661/J). As will be seen~ ~s pereeived pragmatic approach 
of ignoring the pedigree of the rule also played an important role in the Anglo 
decision. , ;:: 
De Villiers J rejected the argument on behalf of the applicant that the Regal 
decision ourawed the source of the right to t~teral iupport, namely English law 
ofnuUanoo -
. . 
"Regal did ~ot outlaw the reference to English decisf'?JlS on support. Nor did Reg'm contam a 
··· genOral propibition agajnst the use of English ~ons. The essence of &gal was that the 
Roman-Du~ authorities should first be consi~ because the two systems were not 
necessarily ~dentical in all respects•• (371E-F). 
According ~o :Pe Villiers J, the fact that ther¥, is nothing in the Regal decision 
that compe~ the eourt to jettison the principle of supporls whether one calls it a 
TSAR 200~·2 llSSN 02S7 -77471 
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"doctrine"" or a "right," does not matter"(372C). De Villiers J argued- that even 
though the concept of a '"right' to support was unknown in Roman law and 
Roman .. Dutch law, the principles of Roman and Roman-Dutch law underlying 
the various remedies available for an injured neighbour would have produced 
the same results, as was accepted in the Rouliot and Coronation decisions under 
the "doctrine'' of support (372D). 
De Villiers J reasoned further that the Rouliot s.nrl rnrnn.nti.nn riP.ci~ion~ 
should be followed: 
a These judgments have been "in operation" for more than a hundred years. 
A court should not readily disturb the older judgments (372F); 
b The reason for the adoption in these judgments of the principle of support 
was not the pedigree of the rule. The motivation of the judges in deciding 
the property law issue in Rouliot. was to lay down a rule because they 
thought it was just and equitable and the rule enjoyed universal 
recognition (3720-1); and 
c The Regal decision does not require the Rouliot and Coronation decisions 
to be abandoned (3721). 
4 Decision o~ the ambit of mineral right 
The Court's decision that relates to the ambit of mip.eral rights may be de-
scribed, for the sake of convenience, as relating on the one hand to the right 
.of lateral and surface support, and on the other hand to the diversion of water. 
~ese two aspects_ are now discussed in more detail. · · 
4.1 Lat~ral and surface support 
With .the aforegoing arguments on behalf of the applicant out of the way, the 
application for- an order that Anglo is entitled to· conduct open-cast mining was 
· dismissed by the court for the following reasons: 
a it relied on a common law rule that does not exist; . 
b even if it is accepted that the applicant intended to rely on a legally implied 
term, it fails because no such term is implied in our law; 
c the cession, which is conclusive, does not expressly or tacitly provide for. 
open~cast mining; and 
d the facts relied upon by the applicant do not reflect the knowled:ge of the 
?arties at the time of concluding the cession (38~H-383A). 
In reliance upon Elektrisiteitsvoorsieningskommissie v Fourie (1988 2 SA 627 
(T)), De Villiers J initially decided that the right to support is a shorthand 
description of the owner's entitlement to the use and enjoyment of the surface 
and to enforce the same against third parties (370~ F). Whether one uses Ro-
man law· or English law as a starting point was immaterial to De Villiers J 
{370F). The court analysed the Eskom decision and a case discussion thereof by 
Van der Vyver ("Expropriation, rights, entitlements and surface support of 
land" 1988 SALJ 1) (380H•382D). De Villiers J, with respect, incorr~y 
held that in terms of the doctrine of rights the "right to lateral support" is a 
capacity or competence (382E; see further, Badenhorst "Mineral law and the 
doctrine of rights: a microscope of magnification?"··2006 Obiter 000. · 
The court held that the starting point of th~ enquiry into the ambit of 
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co$on-law mineral rights must tie the granting of :mineral rights (37 SA). The 
inteiltion of the parties has to be· ascertained in the light of the knowledge of 
the flarties at the time of the concl~on of the agreement (3820). The court 
dre1_ a distinction between implied terms which are imported ex lege into ~ 
a~ent and tacit terms which are ·imported into the actual or presumed 
inteijltion of the parties (373H-I). ImppCd terms are imposed by law from with-
out ~d do not originate in the conSensus of the parties. Implied terms· may 
derive from the cottimon law!t precedent, trade, usage, custom or statute (374A-
B)f. tacit ~ iS an ~exp~sed pr<4vision. of a contra~. th_at is based on the 
co · on or lDlputed mtention of th~ parties and that Is inferred from the 
exp terms or the agreement and the surrounding circumstances (374}. 
lle court regarded so-called "co~on law rights" of a mineral right holder 
as eJfamples of terms that our courts ~ave implied ex lege into the agreement or 
grant, if it contains no stipulation to the contrary (375A). The so-called ' 40an-
~ rights" can be stated to flow fro,m the terms implied by law (rules of law) 
or !~om consens~ terms in a contra~t, either e;xpres~ly or tacitly (376H-I). 
R~gardin.g implied terms· of an ~eement, the court _found that the appli-
~J: posi.tion must be ~t, by itni?lication of law, i~ would have all_ the 
an ... i.ary nghts that are directly npcessary for the enJOyment of the nght 
~'ted. This would only be the position if nothing to the contrary appears 
froni the cession of mineral rights (375B-C). H~wever, the court was of the. 
vi~~ that the position is fundament8J.ly different ~ the case of OJ?en-cast 
m1mng (375C and 380G). The law does not, according to the court, l.Dlply a term; that the owner of land agrees to ''part" with his right to support (37SG 
and i380F). De Villiers J held that p~g with the right to support is not a 
natutalia of a grant of a mineral rightt It is not an ancillary right based on any 
term implied ·by la~ (3750). If, however, the· term is implied that the owner is 
r~taiping his support of the surface! fl. conflict situa?-on between the mineral 
ngh~ holder and the owner of land 1sl absent, according to the court (373E) .. 
Tlie court rejected the view that the right to use open-cast mining is one of 
the ~cillary rights which can be im.pll.ed on the basis it is directly necessary to 
enable the grantee to exercise his ptimary right (see 377B-380E). The court 
found that the applicant l;tas failed to prove that optimal utilisation of the coal 
reseljVCS may .only be achieved by opep.-ca.St methods and that open--cast meth· 
ods ~ therefore reasonably necess~ under the. circumstances (see 383B-. 
3871.). The court found that the applicant did not prove that it would be acting 
reasonably in conducting open-cast mining operati~ns on the property (390E). De Villiers J decided that the ¢mmon law does not imply a term in the 
cessibn that the applicant is entitled tb mine "optimally,, (389B-C). The court 
reasoned that in the decisions of Trojan ExploratiQn Co ( Pty) Ltd v Rustenburg 
Platinum Mines Ltd(I996 4-SA 499 (A)) and Hudson v Mann, the references to 
"sub~diary or ancillary rights,' of a· 'mineral right holder did not include a 
referf3Ilce to any entitlement tel "optimally'~ carry on mining operations 
(389C-E; see also~ 397F). The stated· cases were interpreted by the court as 
I 
meat;ring "that the law is that the mineral rights holder is only entitled to 
·'or~ and reasonable enjoyment',:not 'optimal' enjoym~nt of his mineral 
righ~". The court reasoned that this legal rule is in accordance with the civiliter 
modlf principle of the law relating to servitudes (389F). -The court correctly 
poinied out that "optimal utilisation~~ is not a common law concept, but a 
noti<)n derived from the Minerals Act SO of.l991 (388A; ·see also 3970). 
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. The court held that the Minerals Act also.did not imply a term in the cession 
that the applicant is entitled to ''optimally utilise" its mineral rights (389A~B). 
It was confrrmed that the provisions of the Minerals Act did not add to or 
subtract from common law mineral tights (3881; see also 390C). The cour1 
correctly explained that the Minerals Act was a regulatory act that regulated 
inter alia, the exercise of mineral rights, which were obtained by agr.eement 01 
otherwise under the common law (3880). Section 5(1) of the Minerals Act re· 
affirmed the entitlements of a mineral right holder that accords substantiall~ 
with the primary entitlements of the common law, but the exercise thereofwa 
subject to the regulatory provisions of the ~erals Act (see 388D-I 394E) 
Section 5(1) of the Minerals Act by implication recognised a memorial of th 
holder's ancillary rights as supplemented by the residual provision of the com 
mon law (394F).The court also rejected t,p.e assumption made by applicant tha 
upon granting of a mining licence and approval of an environmental managf 
ment programme (EMPR) in terms of the Minerals Act, it could exploit th 
minerals on the property in any manner that may be necessary for optimf 
exploitation of the minerals, subject only to limitations imposed by its minin 
licence and the EMPR (see 390B). · · 
One must note in passing that the decision in· Anglo was delivered on 2 
September 2004 when· the Minerals Act had al.ready been repealed: by sectio 
110 of the Minerals and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 ·or 2003. A 
amendment of the applicant's notice of motion to refer to its mining autho: 
isation granted in terms of the Minerals Act a8 "read with a defmition of 'ol 
order rights' in item 1 of Schedule II'' of Act 28 of 2003 was grant~ by tl 
court (361E). The commencement of the act on 1 May 2004 does not, howeve 
impact on what was decided by the court. In terms of item 7(1) of Schedule 
an "old order mining right" (which includes a mineral right in the bundle ' 
rights, permissions and permits) remains in force for 5 years l.mtil 30 Ap1 
2009. The "old order mining right" remains subject to its terms and conditio1 
under which it was granted. In other words, the terms regarding ambit of t]. 
"old order mining right" remains unchanged, unless they are contrary "to 
. provision of the Constitution of the Republic of South Mrica. {item 7{ 4: 
Upon conversion of an "old order mining right" into a new mining right t1 
terms regarding the ambit thereof would pr:obably remain the same. As 
matter of fact, the imp~t of the Anglo decision on the parameters of mine1 
rights is important during the transitional period when old order rights ha 
been converted into new mining rights. Case law on the. conflict between ow 
ers of land and holders of mineral .rights or mining rights in terms of t 
common law {see Franklin and Kaplan ch iii and iv) will by ana:logy be it 
portant in resolving the conflict between owners of land and holders of (n• 
order) mining rights to minerals in terms of Act 28 of 2003 (Dale et al Soz 
African Mineral and Petroleum LAw (2005) 136)~ The reader is referred to 1 
resolution of such conflicts by section 54 of the Mineral and Petroleum F 
sources Development Act. Section 54 provides that if a holder of a mining ri1 
is denied access to commence with mining on the land by the owner {or. law 
occupier) due to refusal or unreasonable demands being made by the owner ' 
lawful occupier) or difficulty in tracing the owner, the regional manager c 
follow a process leading up to the parties being requested by the regio: 
manager to reach an agreement for I_oss or damage. Altematively,1the regio: 
manager can under certain circumstances recommend to th~ minister of min 
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a1s and bnergy the expropriation of ownership of the land in terms of section 55 
~ . 
of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Pevelopment Act. In the absence of 
reachin~ an agreen:tent for loss or damage, compensation has to be determined 
by arbifiration in accordance with the ·Arbitration Act 42 of 1965 or by a 
compete.nt court. The impact of the prqVisions of section 54 in a case like 
the present one will, however, not be dealt with further in this disc:ussion. 
On thb authority of the Rouliot and Co'ronation decision, De Villiers J held 
that the: owner of the land should not be deprived of the support without 
express!~ or tacitly agreeing thereto (3730-.p). The court explained that parting 
of suppOjrt by a landowner has to be specif_i~y agreed upon either expressly or 
tacitly (3750 and 3800). If .the owner did not expressly or tacitly waive his 
rights m· regard to support of the surf~~ the conflict rules, like the rule in l:!u4son M '!""'' are a~rding to the co~ not applicable (373E). A waiver of 
nght to ertical support IS never presumeq. (see 382E-G). The court found that 
the resp~ndent did not expressly or tacitlf waive his rights with re~d to the 
support ~f the surface of the land (373E)~ · 
)"'he ccturt foun4 that the right to conduct open-cast mining operations .was 
not granted in express terms in the cessipns. In other words, the cession con-
tained n~ express waiver. of the surface dWn.er's right to support the surfaee 
(391D-EJ.. With reference to the Arthur S$ki 9CSsion the co:urt found that the 
intention: of the parties was clear that min]"Qg would take place underground. In 
addition,Jthe owner as cedent specifically r~rved the right to live and farm on 
the surfa~ of the property (3920; as to the interpretation of the terms of the 
cession, see 391E-392G and 39~H-393A). The courtrfound that the wording of 
the ':f~ is not. such that it unequivocall~ conveys the impression that open· 
cast. · · g was mtended (394B). : 
De V~ers J indicated that Hudson v .kfann did not concern subjacent or 
lateral supPort (396C). The court reason~~ that the dictwn from Hudson v 
Mann hasJ to be read against the background of the facts of the case. It involved 
a claim by a miner to ·have access to a shaft which had been sunk on the 
property py a previous mineral right hold~r for purposes of exploration and 
mining (396C and 397 A). According to De Villiers J the Hudson decision does 
;no~ justifY the argument thai open--cast mining is a subsidiary or ancillary right 
without which the holder of a mineral rigqt is unable to effectively carry on 
mining oberations (396F). De Villiers J distinguished· the Hudson decision 
(which involved a case of irreconcilable conflict) from the instant case. Accord~ 
ing to thet court such irreconcilable conflict, between the parties was absent in 
the present case: "The applicant has no enqtlement to let down the surface and 
the respo~dent, on the other hand, is entitled, as owner of the surface, not to 
have the s)lrface let down" (397F). 
4.2 Dec$on on the diversion of the str~ of water 
l . . ; . 
The court ~ecided that the ~pplicant did nd,t make out a. case on the facts that 
the reserves it intended to mine by open~cast mining methods on the property 
would be ~terilised by the stream of water. It did, therefore, not show that it· 
WaS reasonably necessary to conduct open~t mining operations on the prop-
erty (399H .. I). The applicant, therefore:t did·not hold the common law right to 
divert the tributary on the respondent's property {4oOG). 
. . ' 
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5 Section 25 of the constitution 
The court also paid brief attention to the impact of section 25 of the constitu-
tion on its decision. According to the court, if the argument of the applicant 
regarding the implied term that deprived the owner· of surface ~upport was 
upheld, it would result in an implied term that had the effect of depriving 
the owner, without his consent, of the fmal aspect of his ownership that is of 
practical value to him (see 398B-D). According to De Villiers J such depriva-
tion of an owner without his consent constitutes a deprivation in terms of 
section 25(1) of the constitution (398E 3980). This deprivation, a.Ccording to 
the court, is not an expropriation because the state does not acquire use of the 
surface (398E). If such term is implied in all contracts of cession of mineral 
rights it would, according to the court, constitute a "law of general applica-
tion'\ as is envisaged in section 25. According to the court, the provisions of 
section 36 of the constitution would then have to be considered (398H). · The 
court was of the opinion that the p~ent case does not comply with section 
36(1)(e) of the constitution, namely that there should not be less restrictive 
means to achieve the purpose (3981). The court concluded that there is no 
room to facilitate optimal exploitation by reading into the cession of mineral 
rights terms which deprives the owner of the use of the surface. The court 
reasoned that section 25, read with section 36 of the constitution, prohibits it 
in the light of the l~s stringent remedy available (399A-B). · 
Regarding the expropriation of the right of ~urface support, one should be 
mindful of the Eskom decision. Eskom wanted t-o expropriate the right to 
lateral and . surface support that an owner of land had retained by express 
·reservation and enforced against a joint venture of mining companies that 
intended to . conduct open-cast mining operations. Eskom was an outsider 
because the mining companies merely supplied it ~th coal in terms of an 
agreement of sale. The court held that the right to lateral and surface support 
was not an independent right or a right that could be separately expropriated 
(see 6361-639AjB). According to Kriegler J, the.detached and abstract right to 
allow the withdrawal of the surface support· was not capable of separate ex-
istence or acquisition by Eskom insofar as the right was irrefutably linked to 
the legal relationship _between the owner and holder of mineral rights. (see 
639B-D). Because the right to surface support was not needed by Eskom itself 
(but the miner), the power to expropriate in terms section 43 of the Electricity 
Act 40 of 1958 was held to be lacking (see ·.6390-G)~ 
6 Discussion 
The court's decision regarding the nature of a "right to surface" should have 
been that it is an entitlement and not a competence. The court's focus on the 
ambit of rights by ascertaining the entitlements of competing ·rights in order to 
resolve the conflict between parties is to be welcomed. 
To summarise the court's decision on the ambit of a mineral right, the 
entitlements .of a mineral right are implied by law, whereas the ancillary enti-
tlements can arise by law or from express or tacit terms of the contract. Ancil-
lary e~titlements are those entitlem~nts that are ~tly necessary for the 
enjoyment of a mineral right. The entitlement to conduct open-cast mining 
is, however, not implied by law. The "right" to conduct open:.cast mining is 
also not an ancillary entitlement that is directly necessary to enable the holder 
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of a mineral right to exercise a wining right or to mine optimally. The· right to 
open-cast mining can only be acqUired by the holder of a mineral right if the 
o;wner of the land has agreed expressly or tacitly thereto. In other words, the 
o~er of~ land is not dep~ved of the surf~ support: without expressly or 
tacitly agreemg thereto. Section 5(1) of the Minerals Act only re-affirmed the 
p!rimary entitlements of the common law. The exercise of entitlements by virtue 
of a mineral right was, however,_· subject to the limitations imposed by the 
Nfin.erals Act. . '/ 
! The entitlements of a mineral right could in light of (and for purposes of) the 
Anglo decision be formulated as- follows, namely the entitlement of: 
i . . 
(.) use, which entails the entitletnent to use the land for the purposes of 
exploitation of minerals to which the mineral rights relate. The entitlement 
includes the following: (i) tlie entitlement to enter upon the· land for 
purposes of prospecting for ~d mining of minerals; (ii) the entitlement to 
prospect for minerals; and (iii) the entitlement to mine the minerals by 
underground mining orily; 
~) disposition, which entails the·erititlem.ent to decide V:ha~ may an~ what may 
.I. J).Ot be done on the land for pllrposes of the expl01tation of mmerals; 
(c) alien(ltion, which entails the entitlement to cede the mineral rights in 
i
: respeCt of the land to ano$er pers·on or to grant ~ prospecting right or 
· mining right in respect thereof; · 
~ ) encumbrance, which entails the entitlement to grant a limited real right 
; (su~h as a us~ruct o~ mortg~~ bond) with ~gaxd to the min~ral right; 
(~) reslStilnce, which entails. the. entitlement to resiSt any unlawful mterference 
l with the exercise of the miner81 right; 
(t) reversionary or minimwn entitlement, that is, the entitlement to regain any 
of the above entitlements if tQ.ey have been transferred for a fixed period 
and the period has lapsed or terminated, or the entitlement to exercise an 
entitlement which has been restricted, after removal of the restriction. 
(Badenhorst "Minerale regte e..n. eiendomsreg - skeiding en samesmelting" 
1989 De Jure 379 390; Badenhorst and Van Heerden "Betekenis van die 
woord mineraal" 1989 TSAR 452 459; :Badenhorst "The revesting of state· 
heid entitlements to exploit nrlnerals in South Africa: pri.vatisation or 
deregulation?" 1991 TSAR llfl 115; Badenhorst and Roodt "Artikel 5(1) 
van die Mineraalwet 50 van 1~1: 'n herformulering van die gemenereg?'' 
1995 THRHR 110; Badenhor8t and Mostert Mineral and Petroleum Law 
of South Africa (frrst published.2004) (Rev Service 2) 3-11 to 3-12; as to the 
reversionary entitlement, see .~Badenhorst Die Juridies~ Bevoegdheid om 
Minerale te Ontgin in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1992 thesis UP) 164-182.) 
.... 
'Iihe existence of some of the abovementioned entitlements are, however, now 
s*bject to the provisions of the· Mineral and Petroleum Resources Develop-
1ent Act, the limitations of which· will not be discussed here. To the above list of primary e~titlem.ents can be added ancillary entitle-
ments. A grant (or reservation) of a mineral right by implication includes all 
a.Pcillary entitlements incidental.to ·the grant (or reservation), being those enti-
tJPnents that are directly necessaty to the enjoyment of the right granted 
(trojan decision 520D-E). Ancillary entitlements flow from terms implied by 
~w or from consensual terms in. a· contract, either express or tacit (Anglo 
d~on 376H-I)~ The law does no~Jmply a term that the owner of land agrees 
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to part with his right of subjacent support in favour of a mineral right hole 
(Anglo decision 375G). An owner may not be deprived of subjacent suppc 
unless he or she has expressly or tacitly (conseJ;lSualiy) agreed thereto (373 
see 380E). What is neceSsarily ancillary depends on the facts of each c; 
(Trojan decision 520F). Ancillary entitlements do not include the entitlem• 
to remove from the land more than is granted to him. (Trojan decision 521 
The entitlement to mine a type of mineral does not authorise the taking 
another type of mineral with which it was found in a.Ssociation (Trojan decis· 
S22F). 
Although it is true that the Hudson decision did not deal with: surfaces· 
port, it still dealt with the conflict between the owner of land and the holdel 
mineral rights exercising their respective rights. It is submitted that the sol 
principles laid down in the Hudson decision pan still be applied to the exer1 
of either primary or secondary entitlements by yirtue of mineral rights, 
nowadays "old order mining rights". · 
·As concerns the court's brief flirtation with constitutional property law, 
current discussion will.not attempt a· detailed analysis of its implications. 
the following is interesting: neither of the parties raised the issue of the c 
stitutionality of the implied term in contracts of cession of miner~ rig 
However, the court still deenied -it necessary to consider the potential imJ 
of its decision ·on the constitutional protection of property. In order to d.o 
the court frrst distinguishes deprivation from expropriation based on the c 
sideration of state acquisition of ownership in the land at stake. Since the s 
does not acquire· anything urider the present circumstances, so the argun 
goes, the action at stake must be a deprivation of property, rather thar 
expropriation. 
The court's second step is to cull some of the requirements for constitu.tic 
protection of property from the relevant constitutional provisions, in orde 
underscore its decision not to uphold the argument that all cessions of min 
righ~ by .implication incorporate the cession of ancillary rights (in partie 
lateral and surface support). In doing so, a number of issues are raised. 
issue relates to the . court's understanding of the requirement of a "lat 
general application''. Authors on constitutional property law agree that 
requirement refers primarily to the fact that, to be constitutional, limitat 
on property should derive from original and delegated legislation, rather· 
administrative policy. (See eg Roux "Property" in Cheadle, Davis and Ha)i 
South African Constitutional Law: The Bill of Rights (2002) 458 and F 
"Section 25" in Woolman et at (eds) Constitutional Law of· South 4 
(2003) ch 12, 28-32, in reliance upon Park-Ross v The Director, Offw• 
Serious Economic Offences 1995 2 SA 148 (C) 167B; .Vander Walt Con:. 
tional Property Law (2005) 144; Blaauw-Wolf "The 'balancing of-interests' 
reference to the principle of proportionality and the doctrine of Giiterabwa 
-a comparative analysis" 1999 SAPR/PL 178 ff; Gildenhuys Onteienin1 
(2001) 93.) Most of these authors also assun;te that common law and custoJ 
law would constitute laws of general application, although Vander Walt 
has indicated that it would be unlikely for rules of common law or custo: 
law to raise issues -of arbitrariness to the extent of invoking the provisio 
section 25(1). · . 
· What the court seems to intend is to view its duty to develop the con 
law and customary law as against other fundam.encil rights and freedon 
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thist case at least against the right to property. The argument essentially is that 
when a court develops the commoh. law or customary law, such judicially 
dri~en development may amount to a "law of general application" that should 
theJil be tested against the p~cular~ provisions of the bill of rights. Unfortu~ 
nately, this argument is abandoned ·.before it blossoms: instead of then con-
siddrlng ·whether its potential decision to read an implied term, of cession of 
ancillary :mineral rights into contracts of this sort may pass the non-arbitrari-
nes$ requirement of section 25(1), the court :nioves straight ahead to its second 
culling: the proportionality inquiry of the general limitations cia~, section 36 
of the constitution. 
. 'f:he construction of a link betweep constitutional development of ordinary 
Iaw!and general applicability of laws·could have provided authors speculating 
about the issue of what a generally applicable law would mean in the context of 
co$on or customary law with a ~h-needed example (see Vander Walt 
Constitutional Property Law 144). However, the argument remains tenuous. 
~problem is that the court here.does not consider- at least not expressly-
whether and to what extent there iS: ·horizontal applicability of the constitu-
tio$1 property clause in disputes ~such as the present. It is assumed that there is 
(of FOurse!) horizontal applicability. It is discounted, however, that the struc-
tur~ and targets of the constitutional property clause may not render it as 
readily applicable between private parties as some of the other fundamental 
righ;ts. In this regard, Roux's observations - which may have shed light on the 
maver - w;e not con~dered. Roux indicated convincingly that _the two basic 
con~pts of "deprivation" and "expropriation" developed in terms of the con-
stitqtiqnal property clause. technically relate to actions undertaken in the ex-
ercise of state power$. Where these powers are exercised by private persons or . 
ins~tutions, their actions will be ascriped to the state. The acknowledged mean-
ing bf "deprivation" thus relates to: the regulation of property by the state. (RoUx. "Section 25" in Woolman et al ( eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 
(20q3, original service) ch 46, 6-8. C/Yan der Walt Constitutional Property Law 
(20q5) 48.) ,.· 
Nevertheless, the court here acknowledges that a decision to uphold one 
part;y's argument that it is entitled to particular rights .will result in a depriva· 
tio~ of.the other party, who is the owner of the property to which such rights 
rela~e. As the court indicates, the influence of one person's rights over the 
property of another . will then nearly· always be seen as a deprivation rather 
tha.Ij. an expropriation because "the :state does not acquire anything". The 
coutt thus affords primacy to the characteristic of state acquisition of property 
in distinguishing between expropriation and deprivation. This approaCh dis-
COU¥.ts all other factors that may di$1fuguish deprivation from expropriation 
(see1Van der Walt Constitutional LaW':(2005) 130-131 and Mostert and Baden-
horst "Property" in Bill of Rights Compendium (2006) 3FB-41 fi). Simulta-
neously, the court asserts the horiz.ontal applicability of the constitutional 
pro'erty clause by regarding its own~~ecisions as some form of ''state action" 
tha~ should b~ evaluated on the same basis as legislative activity. 
The non .. arbiqariness requirement. is not mentioned in the court's short 
ana,brsis at all, which means that the bburt does not get to answer the question 
of whether there' is a suff'reient reason. for a specific infringement, judged on a 
complexity of relationships between :the owner and the property, the right 
holqers ~d the property and the oW;ti.er and the right holders, among others. 
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(See First National Bank of South Africa Ltd t/a Westbank v Commissioner. 
South African Revenue Service 2002 4 SA (Cq par 100 and the subsequent 
application of this test of non-arbitrariness in, eg Mkontwana v Nelson Man-
deJa Metropolitan Municipality; Bissett v Buffalo City Municipality; Transje1 
Rights Action Campaign v ·MEC for /.;ocal Government & Housing in the Pro-
vince of Gauteng 2005 1 SA 530 (CC) par 35.) However, the proportionality oi 
infringements on private property (in terms of s 36(1)) receives attention.· Tht 
court chooses to focus on the fact that there were less restrictive means avail· 
able to achieve the intended purpose (of engaging in specific mining activities). 
Under the circumstances, it would probably not have influenced the out 
come of the dispute much if a "thinner''" arbitraiiness test was employed, rathe: 
than the "thicker" proportionality test. (See Roux "Property" in Woolman e 
al (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa (2003, original service) ch 46: 9; VaJ: 
der Walt Constitutional Property Law (2005) 145 ff.) Applying an arbitrarines 
test would probably have highlighted the anomalies of a court's attempt at self 
restriction through horizontal applicability of the fundamental right to prop 
erty much sooner than where a court considers questions such as less: restrictiv 
means and balancing of competing interests under a proportionality enquiry. 
'· 
7 Conclusion 
An owner's "right to surface support" should be construed as an entitlement c 
ownership of land. In terms of the Anglo decision a mineral right implicitly ha 
as its content the entitlement to mine by underground operations. The entitlE: 
ment to mine by open-cast mining is,. however, not a naturalia of the grant of 
mineral right. The right to open-cast mining can only be acquired by the holde 
of a mineral right if the owner of the land has expressly or tacitly agree. 
thereto. Acco~ding to the court in the Anglo dpcision, deprivation of an owr 
er's surface support is not possible without his or her express or tacit conser 
and such deprivations may even constitute a deprivation for purposes of sec 
tion 25(1) of the constitution. · 
The problem of deprivation of surface support in the Anglo decision coul 
have been resolved with application. of property law or the law of contrac 
Reliance on the propertY clause was probably unnecessary under th~ circun 
stances. The fact that the c6urt did consider the. applicability of the constitl 
tiona! property clause to the relevant case places the question about t1: 
. horizontality of section 25 in a different perspective. 
The real value of the decision lies,. however, in the deterrilina.tion of the amb 
of a mineral ri~t. This part of the Anglo decision will remain important f, 
purposes of the ambit of "old order mining rights" and the grant of ne 
mining rights by the state in terms of the Mineral and Petroleum Resouro 
Development Act in respect of land owned by the private owners. The state ; 
future grantor' of mining· rights should take note of the Anglo decision, whi< 
seems to provide protection to owners of land insofar as the entitlement : 
undertake open-cast mining has not been rega;rded as an automatic given in 
grant of mining rights. The relationship between the owner of land, the state . 
grantor of new rights and miners would be more complex than previous] 
because the owner (or his predecessor in title) may, unlike in the past, n 
have had any part in demarcating the parameters ·or the new mining rig 
against the background of ownership. Apart from the protection granted 
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~~wner of land by section 54 of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources 
~"'v~lopment Act, constitutional p~ptection against expropriation of the own-
er is entitlement to surface support (or the use of the surface in general) in terms 
ofj section 25 of the constitution ~1 then indeed become relevant and useful. 
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